Bitcoin Security Funding Alarm Unfounded - Specialist Debunks Unwarranted Panic
In a recent discussion, Pierre Rochard, VP of Research at Riot Platforms, argued that the commonly cited "Bitcoin security budget problem" is a misconception based on a category error. Critics, according to Rochard, confuse two distinct aspects: the immutable Bitcoin protocol rules, which are enforced by full nodes and private keys, and the economic incentives miners receive to finalize settlement (prevent censorship or block reorganization).
Rochard explains that miners do not set or change Bitcoin's rules; they only compete to propose valid blocks within the rules. The "security budget" is not a fixed pot of money but a function of how costly attacks like censorship or reorganization become. Factors such as the fee market, user controls, miner competition, and difficulty adjustments interact dynamically to increase the cost of attacks, especially as block subsidies drop.
One of the mechanisms that help increase the cost of attacks is the use of tools like Replace-By-Fee and Child-Pays-For-Parent. These tools allow wallets and receivers to rebroadcast transactions with higher fees or attach a high-fee child to an unconfirmed parent, instantly elevating inclusion priority. In the case of a shallow reorg, urgent users rebid with Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pays-For-Parent, making the next parent-confirming block valuable.
Mining pool competition also operationalizes the game theory. When fees are rich and visible, each pool has a dominant incentive to defect first and claim them now, collapsing any cartel that tries to suppress or sequence transactions for nefarious purposes. Users can raise the number of confirmations required for high-value transfers, stretching the attacker's time and energy budget while urgent senders bid up fees to start the clock immediately.
Stratum v2 job negotiation further reduces pool-level control by letting miners choose their own templates, making coordinated censorship even harder to sustain. Hardware compromise scenarios on Bitcoin are viewed as throughput shocks rather than rule failures.
Rochard emphasizes that any credible, sustained attack would require majority hash, unwavering cartel discipline despite a rising fee bounty for defection, exchanges that refuse to raise confirmations, and users who refuse to rebid. The network's "security budget for finality" is not a fixed paycheck, but a market price that rises when needed.
This perspective contrasts with critics who worry that declining subsidies could eventually fail to incentivize miners sufficiently unless fees rise dramatically or Bitcoin alters its monetary policy—a change many in the community strongly resist. Rochard's view is that Bitcoin's long-term security is sustained by self-reinforcing economic and protocol mechanisms that adapt to changing incentives, rather than by a fixed, diminishing subsidy alone.
At press time, BTC traded at $117,746.
[1] Source: Pierre Rochard, Twitter thread, 2022. [2] Source: Nic Carter, CoinDesk, "The Bitcoin Halving: A Guide for the Perplexed," 2020.
Investing in Bitcoin, according to Pierre Rochard, benefits from technology-driven mechanisms that increase the cost of potential attacks, such as Replace-By-Fee and Child-Pays-For-Parent, which help secure the network's finality without relying on a fixed "security budget." Contrary to critics' concerns, Rochard argues that Bitcoin's long-term security is safeguarded by self-reinforcing economic and protocol mechanisms that adapt to changing incentives, rather than a fixed, diminishing subsidy alone.
